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ABSTRACT 
 
Kant is famous for his use of transcendental arguments in the transcendental deduction. 
This thesis examines how such a transcendental argument is used within Kant’s 
methodological framework. Following the work of Henrich and Walker, the paper asks 
whether transcendental arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason are compatible with 
Kant’s methodology in general. We find that these arguments and Kant’s methodology 
are compatible, and that transcendental arguments are indeed very weak arguments by 
Walker’s standards. However, the entire transcendental deduction should be understood 
as a deduction writing that uses transcendental arguments particularly effectively 
according to Kant’s own methodological standards. 
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Kant’s Use of Transcendental Arguments 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The influence of Kant’s theoretical philosophy has reached many notable scholars 
of the twentieth century, including Heidegger and Strawson. Still, much of their work has 
been to interpret what is actually going on in the Critique. Even today, there is persistent 
debate as to which interpretation is correct. Thus, Kant’s Critique has had a profound 
impact on philosophy today. 
The most important, pivotal part of the Critique of Pure Reason is the 
transcendental deduction, which contains most elements of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy.1
Dieter Henrich, in his article, “Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the 
Methodological Background of the First Critique,” lays out an interpretation of Kant’s 
transcendental deduction. Henrich also illuminates and clarifies many of Kant’s moves in 
the deduction. He also has an account of Kant’s methodology. For Henrich, a 
consideration of methodology is invaluable for understanding the Critique; we must 
understand Kant’s method in the transcendental deduction in order to understand the 
 In the deduction, Kant attempts to explain how we are warranted in using 
certain concepts and rules (categories) when we make judgments about experience. He 
also relates to us how synthesis plays a key role in organizing our cognitive capacities. 
                                                 
1 There are two versions of the Critique of Pure Reason, the first of which was published in 1781. The 
second edition features some revision, especially in the transcendental deduction, and was published in 
1787. Scholarly debate, with a few notable exceptions, has concentrated on the second edition, which Kant 
intended to be the authoritative version of his work. In addition, recent scholarship seems to concentrate on 
the second edition of the transcendental deduction (the “B deduction”), making a reading of the second 
edition more relevant. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, we will focus on the second edition of the 
Critique, instead of the first, for clarity, brevity and relevance. 
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deduction in terms of its parts and as a whole. For these reasons, I will interpret the 
transcendental deduction through the lens of Dieter Henrich’s article. 
 According to Henrich, the transcendental deduction is modeled after a “deduction 
writing” (a particular kind of legal document used in the eighteenth-century) in terms of 
content, style, and form. This means that we should understand the deduction as derived 
from a juridical procedure instead of as a mere argumentative deduction consisting of 
syllogistic proofs. This model of the transcendental deduction, one that views it as a mere 
logical proof, has been prominent today and in the past when talking of Kant’s project of 
justifying the categories. Henrich’s insight that the deduction is modeled on juridical 
procedure is thus a departure from how Kant has been interpreted.  
Ralph Walker, in his article, “Kant and Transcendental Arguments,” has put 
forward an analysis of transcendental arguments. This analysis attempts to determine the 
form, content, context and applicability of transcendental arguments. Walker’s work is 
important for a number of reasons. First, it remains unclear to many scholars exactly what 
is happening argumentatively in the transcendental deduction, and an analysis of 
transcendental arguments may help alleviate this difficulty. Second, such an analysis can 
help us determine whether a transcendental argument is being applied to the appropriate 
context. Third, an analysis of these arguments will give us an understanding of their 
strength or weakness. 
Walker’s view of transcendental arguments does not rely on any consideration of 
Kant’s explicit methodology. It is therefore interesting to know if such a view could fit 
with Kant’s methodology in general, but particularly if it could fit with Kant’s 
methodology for the transcendental deduction. Kant’s use of transcendental arguments in 
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the transcendental deduction is well-known. But exactly how the transcendental 
arguments are working in the deduction is still up for debate. If the two views are 
compatible, we will have both a grasp of Kant’s methodology, its limitations and 
strengths, and a grasp of transcendental arguments, their applicability, limitations and 
strengths. If the two views are incompatible, we will have to gain insight into the 
deduction’s methodology and content from elsewhere. 
There are other questions that are intriguing beyond the mere compatibility or 
incompatibility of the two interpretations: Are transcendental arguments in fact analytic, 
instead of synthetic? Are transcendental arguments context-independent? Can they be 
used in any argumentative context? How strong are these arguments if they are, indeed, 
analytic? And what is the best starting point for a transcendental argument? What 
contributes to the strength of transcendental arguments? Answering such questions allows 
us to gain a more robust understanding of the content of the transcendental deduction. 
I will investigate whether Walker’s take on transcendental arguments could fit in 
the interpretative scheme laid out by Henrich. At first glance, there are some strong 
similarities between what Henrich says of transcendental arguments and what Walker 
says about them. However, there are several elements of Henrich’s and Walker’s papers 
that we should take into consideration to determine the compatibility of the two 
interpretations.  
In this thesis, I will argue that the transcendental deduction is a deduction writing 
of the juridical type, but also that it employs a transcendental argument that is in fact 
analytic and generally weak. Yet I argue that such an argument is used appropriately in 
the transcendental deduction for three reasons: (1) it answers the question of fact and the 
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question of right; (2) it replies to the challenges of the skeptic; (3) it shows the source of 
the categories’ legitimacy and thus, their necessity .2  
 
II. Studies of the Deduction and Kant in General 
 
The internal interpretation of Kant’s deduction concerns itself chiefly with the 
text at hand and regards historical and reconstructive questions as secondary or even 
counterproductive to understanding the text. An internal account of the deduction itself 
needs some historical insight to supplement the strict, face value interpretation that 
A. A Taxonomy of Approaches 
 
Interpretations of Kant’s transcendental deduction vary from one scholar to 
another, but they can be classified as follows. There is the internal approach, used by 
scholars such as Ameriks and Walker, which aims to give an account of the deduction 
based exclusively on the text of the first Critique. There is the historical interpretation, 
used by scholars such as Henrich and Guyer, which aims to determine the salient 
historical influences on the deduction and give an interpretation of it in light of these 
influences. Such a historical interpretation often focuses on the development of the 
deduction and on the evolution of Kant’s own writings. Finally, there is the 
reconstructive interpretation, employed by scholars such as Heidegger and Strawson, 
which regards elements of the deduction as useful only insofar as they can be 
reconstructed to be useful to today’s philosophical landscape. This last approach often 
considers Kant’s positions in light of what modern scholars have said on the subject. 
 
1. The Internal Interpretation 
                                                 
2 The question of fact and the question of right are treated later. 
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authors like Walker use, simply due to the obscure terminology that Kant uses. However, 
the internal approach does have its merits, like being able to present cumbersome, key 
concepts in simple and clear terms without recourse to detailed historical outlines. 
Another benefit of the internal approach is that we do not get too sidetracked with 
historical or developmental concerns; we consider Kant’s arguments within the context of 
the Critique itself. 
Ralph Walker uses the internal approach effectively in his article, “Kant and 
Transcendental Arguments.” He gives a clear account of what a transcendental argument 
is and what form it takes in the transcendental deduction. By doing this, Walker allows us 
a clear analysis of one of Kant’s most important tools in the deduction: transcendental 
arguments. In the article, Walker’s method is to focus exclusively on the text of the 
Critique; thus, his account is internalist.  
In his article, “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument,” Karl 
Ameriks argues that the transcendental deduction and the transcendental aesthetic contain 
a parallel transcendental argument (Ameriks, 86). Ameriks departs from what he calls the 
received interpretation of Kant (e.g., the views of Strawson, which are reconstructive), 
which states that Kant’s aim in the deduction is to prove that objective experience issues 
from self-consciousness. According to Ameriks, Kant argues that we have objectivity 
(and hence, empirical knowledge) only if the categories are universally valid (Ameriks, 
87). Ameriks’ article is internal because he comes to his conclusion by rejecting the 
received interpretation of Strawson while proposing an alternative to the received 
interpretation that is objective and regressive, based on the text of the Critique  (B 48, in 
particular) and the Prolegomena (Ameriks, 88).   
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2. The Historical Interpretation 
 There are many historical interpretations of Kant’s transcendental deduction to 
consider. The historical tradition has some benefit but some drawbacks as well. On the 
one hand, exploring the philosophical concerns, language, and events that were 
contemporary to Kant can lend valuable insight to some more obscure parts of the 
Critique. On the other hand, a historical approach runs the risk of becoming 
reductionistic in this sense: it may suggest that Kant’s work is the mere product of history 
and does not merit further investigation in terms of what philosophical aspects of it are 
relevant today. 
Paul Guyer’s article, “The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories,” develops 
a historical account of Kant’s distinction between objective validity and objective reality. 
By distinguishing between objective reality and objective validity, the two separate tasks 
of the deduction become clear, according to Guyer. Objective validity obtains as long as 
the “subjective conditions of thinking” allow for the cognition of any and all objects. 
Objective reality obtains only if the categories determine what appearances could qualify 
as objects of cognition. Guyer focuses on objective reality as Kant’s intended view, 
laying out the two possible sources of the constraint that categories exert on 
representations (the source of their extralogical necessity). Guyer arrives at these 
conclusions by considering Kant’s passages in the Critique and other passages from 
Kant’s notes and letters during the development of the Critique, making his account 
essentially historical. The rest of the article focuses on a broad historical account of the 
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Critique, and it focuses almost exclusively on the A deduction, giving an account of its 
evolution. 
Dieter Henrich uses a historical interpretation to uncover what a deduction is; his 
findings run against those of the internal interpretation. In his article, “Kant’s Notion of a 
Deduction and the Methodological Background of the first Critique,” Henrich explains 
that the distinction between quid juris and quid facti is paramount to understanding the 
method of the deduction. Henrich also gives supporting historical details to show us that 
Kant’s deduction may not be a syllogistic proof that we have objective knowledge, but 
rather, it is a philosophical investigation modeled after a legal procedure. 
Theodore Adorno, in his lecture, “Deduction of the Categories,” has his own 
historical interpretation of the deduction, which states that Kant can only be properly 
understood in historical terms (Adorno, 121). He says that Kant’s transcendental 
deduction is a dialectical interchange between two historical tendencies: an apologetic or 
dogmatic element and a self-critical element. There is a further dialectic, he says, 
between subjective nominalism (the tendency to view everything as synthesized by a 
thinking subject) and medieval realism (direct realism); the only unmediated and natural 
elements (they are “objective” in that they are not synthesized) we have recourse to are 
the categories, and only through the categories and subjectivity can judgment be made. 
So it is that Adorno says “the innermost core of subjectivity, its secret, is revealed as 
something objective, as the power of objectivity itself’ (Adorno, 127). 
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3. The Reconstructive Interpretation 
The reconstructive method of interpretation is quite popularly employed by 
scholars of Kant’s work (Guyer, 123). One famous reconstructive project is that of Peter 
Strawson. According to Paul Snowdon, Peter Strawson’s book, The Bounds of Sense
 
, 
falls within the reconstructive tradition. In the work, Strawson abandons Kant’s Idealistic 
framework and instead explores what conceptual schemes we could possibly understand 
and employ (Snowdon). Strawson rejects Kant’s notion that realism generates the 
contradictions of the Antinomies. Strawson also uses transcendental arguments in 
opposition to skepticism, albeit outside of Kant’s own framework (Snowdon). The book 
is thus reconstructive in this sense: it selects elements of Kant’s work that are viewed as 
relevant by contemporary philosophical standards and draws its own conclusions from 
them. 
The field of Kant studies, especially focusing on the transcendental deduction, is 
immense in its contributions. This makes the task of finding suitable secondary literature 
for a project such as ours possible. At the same time, however, it is difficult to select what 
literature should be considered and what should be ignored.  
B. Selecting Secondary Literature 
We review Henrich in this thesis first because his clear, focused and self-
contained article on the history and method of the deduction directly answers the 
questions on Kant’s general methodology and aim in the deduction. Moreover, Henrich 
provides insight to the meaning of the terms “quid juris” and “quid facti,” which frame 
the transcendental deduction. Kant says of a deduction that it must answer the question 
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quid juris if it cannot otherwise find “proof that a concept has a legitimate employment” 
(B 117). So the question of right and the question of fact play a vital role in setting the 
task of the deduction. 
Walker has an article that is also clear, focused and self-contained, which is 
exclusively concerned with the form and application of transcendental argument, a tool 
used by Kant in his deduction. Such an account also tells us what Kant’s particular 
method is in the deduction: transcendental argumentation. Walker gives such a clear and 
thorough account of the potency and form of transcendental arguments that he must be 
included in the thesis. When we consider Henrich’s strong account of Kant’s aim and 
method and Walker’s strong account of transcendental arguments, we must wonder if 
such accounts could be viewed as compatible. If they are, we could then provide a 
commentary on two clear authors and their unified account of Kant’s method and aim in 
the deduction of the categories. 
Thus, the approach of this thesis is to examine the findings of one historical and 
one internal approach to Kant’s deduction in the secondary literature. This combination 
of consideration gives us a number of advantages. Firstly, we glean the historical insight 
as to the meaning of the question of fact and the question of right. Secondly, we find an 
interpretation of the aim of Kant’s deduction in Henrich that is lacking in other secondary 
literature. Finally, we have a clear and accurate consideration of Kant’s main tool for 
achieving his aim in the deduction; we have an account of Kant’s method in Walker’s 
treatment of transcendental arguments. In the end, we will consider the efficacy of such 
transcendental arguments and whether Kant is right in insisting that they are synthetic. 
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III. Henrich’s Interpretation of Kant 
1. Preliminary Impression of a Deduction 
A. Henrich on Kant’s Methodology 
What is a deduction, in the Kantian sense? Our first inclination is to view any 
deduction as a syllogistic deduction: a drawing out of a conclusion from a set of 
premises. But Henrich insists early on that this is a mistake and that it leads to a 
misunderstanding of Kant’s methodology as not a “unitary and well-structured program” 
(Henrich, 30). We read the famous line from the Critique:  
Jurists, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a legal action the question of 
right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quid facti); and they demand that both be 
proved. Proof of the former, which has to state the right or the legal claim, they entitle the 
deduction. (A 84/B 116)  
 
Here, Kant appears to distinguish the question of fact from the question of right in order 
to delineate what a deduction should or should not be. It appears that a deduction should 
draw a conclusion out of premises in the “ordinary logical sense,” with an eye to 
justifying legal claims, or, more broadly, normative claims. Thus, we could view Kant’s 
deduction as proceeding along quite ordinary philosophical lines in its aim to justify our 
use of the pure concepts of the understanding.    
In contrast to this reading of one passage, Henrich looks to late eighteenth-century 
academic language for an alternative interpretation of the deduction. His reason for this 
move is that, firstly, Kant is able to construct valid and clear syllogistic proofs, as in the 
Antinomies of Pure Reason, but secondly, that the transcendental deduction, if taken to 
be an attempt at a series of clear syllogistic proofs, is a blatant a failure. He therefore 
seeks an explanation more generous to Kant. 
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2. Deduction Writings and the Transcendental Deduction 
Henrich maintains that Kant adopts the term “deduction” from a juridical context 
and transfers it to a philosophical argument, namely, the transcendental deduction. 
Deduktionsschriften, or deduction writings, were legal documents that were in wide use 
by the beginning of the eighteenth-century. They contained legal arguments distributed 
by governments, attempting to justify a legal claim to a territory, the succession of a 
reign, or some other property. Both parties involved in the legal controversy were 
required to submit a deduction writing, according to existing legal proceedings (Henrich, 
32). In each case, detailed arguments were given regarding the origin of the claim and 
how it had been maintained over time.  
Kant was familiar with deduction writings. J.S. Pütter was a preeminent deduction 
writer of Kant’s time. The textbook that Kant used for his frequent lectures on natural law 
was co-authored by Pütter. Kant, during his time as a librarian in the royal library of 
Königsberg, noticed and commented on various deduction writings, and he was also 
familiar with their terminology (Henrich, 33). Kant could also justifiably assume that his 
audience would understand the term “deduction,” used in a philosophical context, to refer 
to the juridical context whence it arose. However, the practice of deduction writing ended 
very soon with the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. With the end of deduction 
writings, the terminology they used became unfamiliar and rare. Thus, some readers of 
the Critique might not have understood the juridical context of the term “deduction.”  
There were published methodological guidelines for a deduction writing. For 
example, one methodologist wrote in 1752 that a good deduction should be brief and 
clear. Since a deduction focuses on justifying a claim to a possession or usage, it should 
12 
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not focus on theoretical principles or unnecessary digressions (Henrich, 34). Pütter 
himself aimed at achieving this methodological paradigm in his own deduction writings. 
If he did not, he would attach a brief outline (Kurzer Begriff) at the end of the writing, 
summarizing the main points of his argument. Kant also has a brief outline at the end of 
his transcendental deduction, following the juridical practice. Henrich tells us:  
It appears that Kant thought that his deduction as a text should be modeled on the 
juridical paradigm and meet its criteria of excellence. Thus we conclude…that Kant 
wrote the text of the deduction of the first Critique following the standards of a good 
juridical deduction, which focuses exclusively upon justifying a claim. (Henrich, 34) 
 
Much of Henrich’s paper stakes its insight on this premise: that Kant’s transcendental 
deduction is a philosophical work using the juridical procedure of the deduction writing 
as its methodological paradigm. Both the text and its argumentative form of Kant’s 
deduction should meet the standards of a deduction writing if Henrich’s claim is to be 
supported.  
 
3. The Argumentative Form of Deduction Writings 
Christian Wolff was the first philosopher to write a definitive piece on the 
argumentative form of deduction writings, making a distinction between innate and 
acquired rights (Pütter and Achenwall call them “absolute” and “hypothetical rights”) 
(Henrich, 35). Absolute rights are “inseparable from a human being as such” and obtain 
in virtue of someone’s being human. A hypothetical right, on the other hand, originates at 
a particular time and place, in a particular factum (fact or action). An example of an 
absolute right could be the right to retain property if it is acquired through valid contract, 
or the right to legal defense if accused of a crime. Henrich gives an example of a 
hypothetical right: I have the right to carry a title of nobility if I am a legitimate child of 
13 
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an appropriate couple. Or, I have the right to inherit a house if it was willed to me in a 
valid last will. In these cases, if the claim to the house or title is disputed, it is very 
important to know the origin of the claim.  
 It was required of a deduction writing that it give a “report of the story” or 
Geschichtserzählung. This report is essentially a genetic account of where the claim 
originated and from where and how long it has been maintained. With regard to the 
example of a last will, Henrich says, “It is possible to tell a story about the way in which 
the will has been conceived of and arrived at, when it was written and how it has been 
preserved” (Henrich, 36). These elements of the story would be very important, 
especially if one or more facts were contested by the opposing party. It is essential that a 
deduction writing get the facts right. As Henrich says, “In order to decide whether an 
acquired right is real or only presumption, one must legally trace the possession 
somebody claims back to its origin” (Henrich, 35).  
 We can now see that a Deduktionsschrift and the transcendental deduction have 
one very important question in mind when justifying claims. In the case of a deduction 
writing, the claim will be to a material possession or title or some other privilege. In 
Kant’s case, the claim is to have synthetic a priori knowledge of the world, or in other 
words, the claim is that the categories apply to experience to form cognition.  
Human cognition is a priori if it arises independently of experience, while 
cognition is a posteriori when it has its roots in empirical experience. A cognition or 
proposition is called pure a priori when it has nothing empirical mixed in. For example, 
“One thing is not another” is a pure a priori cognition. Thus, “Every alteration has its 
cause” is a priori, yet mixed with elements drawn from experience; this is a synthetic 
14 
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judgment or cognition (B 3). As Kant tells us, “Necessity and strict universality are 
therefore secure indicators of an a priori cognition, and also belong together inseparably” 
(B 4). On the other hand, if a proposition is thought only as a generalization from past 
experiences, it is a posteriori.  
Inherent to the human understanding are a number of functions that we call 
functions of judgment, which correspond to the categories. They are the basic mechanical 
possibilities of conceptual relations in any judgment. The pure concepts of the 
understanding, or categories, correspond to this table of functions, are products of the 
understanding, and are related to other representations through synthesis (combination). 
In each case (in a deduction writing and in the transcendental deduction), the 
question of fact (quid facti) is vital. As in a deduction writing, some citation of facts will 
be necessary to fend off skepticism about Kant’s claims. For example, a skeptic about 
synthetic a priori judgments may ask where the categories come from, in an attempt to 
show that there simply are no categories. In anticipation of such a challenge, Kant 
explains the logical function of judgments and provides a story about how both the 
categories and logical functions are unified by the same function of the understanding.   
    We are thus led back to Kant’s early distinction between quid juris (where lies 
the legitimacy of a claim?) and quid facti (where lies the origin of a claim?) and how they 
relate to a deduction writing and Kant’s own deduction. While it may appear that a legal 
deduction requires a full citation of the factual elements of the origin of a claim, this is 
not the case. Henrich emphasizes an important point about the two questions. On his 
view, the question of right can be answered even if the question of fact remains buried in 
difficulty (Henrich, 36). Regarding the quaestio juris, for reference in the case of the last 
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will, Henrich tells us, “To answer this question, one has to focus exclusively upon those 
aspects of the acquisition of an allegedly rightful possession by virtue of which a right 
has been bestowed, such that the possession has become property” (Henrich, 36). In other 
words, we need to know the relevant facts surrounding the origin of the right in 
question—in this case, the right to acquire property through valid procedure. Some of the 
relevant facts here are: approximately when the property was willed (was the owner 
alive?), by whom (by the owner?), and whether the actual will meets the various criteria 
for a legal document. The origin of the right must meet with some measure of legal 
standards—here the standard of original acquisition or natural right—but the kind and 
extent of legal justification required will vary depending on the number and severity of 
challenges to the claim, both in a deduction writing and in a transcendental deduction. 
Another factor that could influence the depth and breadth of justification is the level of 
sophistication needed to make the relevant facts clear at all.3
                                                 
3 Henrich does not include these inferences in his paper, but they seem to follow from the fact that a 
deduction writing is a response to a challenge or number of challenges. 
 Henrich goes on to say of 
the transcendental deduction, “We cannot arrive at, and don’t need a comprehensive 
understanding of, the genesis and constitution of these facts [regarding origin] in 
themselves. Yet we must arrive at an understanding of the aspects of them that suffice to 
justify the claims attached to our knowledge” (Henrich, 37). Just as in a deduction 
writing, some relevant facts about the origin of a right must be given to answer the 
quaestio juris.  
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4. The Aim of a Philosophical Deduction and Kant’s Methodology 
The transcendental deduction is an attempt to justify an acquired or hypothetical 
right (Henrich, 39). Certain questions about the origin and usage of the categories had 
been raised by empiricist skeptics (e.g., Hume), so Kant aims to give a justificatory 
account of the categories by clarifying their origin and usage. Many moves in the 
deduction can therefore be understood as providing such a clarification of the origin and 
usage of the categories. This in turn could partially answer that question about what 
conditions would make the usage of the categories possible and legitimate.  
 
According to Henrich, Kant’s general philosophical methodology has four 
important features.
B. Henrich’s Interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction  
4
Second, beginning in the early 1780’s, Kant begins to make a paramount 
distinction between reflection (Überlegen, reflexio) and investigation (Untersuchen, 
examinatio). An investigation is a conscious attempt to make sense of a set of operations, 
such as our use of the categories in judgment, but is preceded by reflection. Kant’s theory 
 First, Kant expresses a stance on the assessment of proofs in logic. 
Along with Descartes, Kant believes that syllogisms are secondary formulations of 
knowledge that has already been acquired. Premises, or Beweisgründe, are more 
important to ascertain, especially their reliability, since it is on these that the justification 
of the conclusion depends (Henrich, 41). Philosophical knowledge cannot be based on 
mere logical possibility, but rather, should be concerned with finding “real reasons” or 
rationes verae. Such real reasons can serve as the premises in genetic accounts of our 
knowledge, as in a philosophical deduction.  
                                                 
4 These views are taken from Kant’s lectures on applied logic. 
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of reflection assumes that our cognitive capacities are linked in a web and cannot be 
reduced to one single “intelligent operation” (Henrich, 42). Each cognitive capacity, 
while linked to the others, becomes spontaneously operative within its own domain. The 
mind must know implicitly which operations belong to which domains in order to prevent 
confusion among operations. “This implies,” says Henrich, “that the principles upon 
which an activity is founded must be known by contrast with the other activities” 
(Henrich, 42). Reflection provides us with such knowledge, and is therefore constant and 
spontaneous and includes some knowledge of the principles under which cognitive 
operations take place. Such principles include the functions of judgment that correspond 
to the categories; according to Kant’s theory of reflection, we are able to distinguish 
between quantity, quality, modality, and relation, since our judgments are based on these 
functions and the categories correspond to them. We are also aware of and can 
distinguish between the pure categories of the understanding clearly: we can imagine 
what the world would be like without causal relations between objects, without substance 
and attribute, and so on.5
                                                 
5 F.C. White provides an account of what the world would be like without each category governing our 
experience in his book, Kant’s First Critique and the Transcendental Deduction. 
  Reflection, although not necessarily explicitly articulated 
knowledge, is a precondition of rationality; we must be aware of and able to distinguish 
between the various functions of our own judgment in order to make any kind of rational 
determination about them. The similarity between reflection and deduction is therefore 
clear: both are partial explanations or articulations of the significant features of the 
relevant general history or operations with which they are concerned. Thinking and 
giving a report of the story regarding a contested claim in a deduction writing are 
18 
 
[Type text] 
 
ongoing activities we cannot step outside of, but in each case we can obtain the required, 
relevant information to justify a given claim. 
 Third, Henrich states that Kant defines investigation as a deliberate attempt to 
resolve contested claims, undertaken only when there are challenges to knowledge 
claims, and that investigation is a correlate of reflection, which is not conscious and is 
constant. A deduction or investigation, then, stays within the domain of reflection, but 
detects and makes certain connections explicitly clear.6 Further, the author says, “it 
relates the principles that orient a discourse to fundamental facts and operations that 
constitute it yet which can also interpret and validate it” (Henrich, 43). In a deduction, we 
should look for principles that relate to fundamental facts which give answer to the 
question of fact and the question of right.7
The fourth (last) feature of Kant’s philosophical methodology in the 
transcendental deduction is its focus on the unity of apperception. The synthetic unity of 
apperception is the original (necessary) unity of all representations under one self-
consciousness; this unity is represented by the phrase “I think.” In other words, we know 
that there is an “I think” in the form of a representation because all representations must 
be combined under one self-consciousness. If they were not, they would be nothing for us 
or would not exist (B 132). The “I think” therefore serves as a representation that 
identifies what is going on between sensibility and the understanding; the two are 
synthetically unified under one self-consciousness, pure apperception. Kant says, “I am 
conscious a priori of their necessary synthesis, which is called the original synthetic unity 
of apperception, under which all representations given to me stand, but under which they 
  
                                                 
6 At least, this is usually the case, says the author. 
7 Such notable facts in Kant’s deduction include the synthetic unity of apperception, space and time, and 
the fact of reason, according to Henrich. 
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must also be brought by means of a synthesis” (B 136). Thus, the manifold of sensible 
intuition and the spontaneity of our thinking in the understanding are necessarily related a 
priori through the understanding. There are two reasons for Kant’s focus on the unity of 
apperception in the transcendental deduction. Firstly, the “I think” is a basic factum 
native to spontaneous, self-conscious reflection—exactly the kind of reflection used in 
the transcendental deduction. Secondly, it is “the self-consciousness that can accompany 
every kind of reflection, regardless of the field of its employment” (Henrich, 45). So, we 
have found two things that are characteristic of transcendental arguments: (1) They relate 
directly to facts of reflection, and (2) they rely on the more fundamental principle of the 
unity of apperception.8
                                                 
8 This is important to note later when we compare Henrich and Walker’s views on the nature of 
transcendental arguments.  
  
Thus, we have Henrich’s view of the transcendental deduction. In summary: (1) 
Kant modeled his philosophical deduction not after syllogistic reasoning, but after a 
juridical deduction or Deduktionsschrift, and we have many historical references to 
demonstrate that this is the case; (2) any good deduction writing puts theory aside and 
answers the questions of fact and the question of right by seeking the relevant features of 
the origin of a particular claim—in the case of Kant’s transcendental deduction, this is 
done by investigating the origin of the categories, and referring to space and time; (3) we 
must understand Kant’s project in terms of reflection and investigation; (4) the “I think” 
was taken as the ultimate justifying and unifying factum in Kant’s philosophical 
deduction and system as a whole. 
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IV. Walker’s Interpretation of Transcendental Arguments 
As noted earlier, Walker is interested in a formal analysis of the transcendental 
deduction, putting aside the historical questions raised by Henrich. Walker says that 
transcendental arguments take the following rough form: “There is experience. It is a 
necessary condition of experience that P; therefore, P.”
A. Walker on the Form of Transcendental Arguments 
9 Walker also views 
transcendental arguments as replies to skepticism. Specifically, on Walker’s view, the 
import of answering skepticism is twofold: (1) there is a need to answer skepticism in 
general and skepticism about the external world in particular; (2) there is need to answer 
skepticism against knowledge claims, and especially how our beliefs relate to “evidence 
we receive through our senses” (Walker, 239). For Kant, certain synthetic a priori 
concepts make experience possible, and without these categories, experience is not 
possible. These categories are thus justified by their indispensability, and they explain 
how we are able to relate our senses to the understanding and self-consciousness. So, 
when Kant uses the categories to explain the possibility of experience in a transcendental 
argument, he is addressing skepticism about our claims to empirical and scientific 
knowledge: this is exactly what a transcendental argument should be doing, on Walker’s 
view.10
Walker does not think Kant is the first philosopher to use arguments with a 
transcendental form—he lays out a pre-Kantian argument for why something must be so, 
lest experience not be possible: the example is Aristotle’s argument for the principle of 
non-contradiction. Knowledge is not possible if the principle is false; this is because 
 
                                                 
9 Walker notes that some scholars substitute cognition for experience, but the overall argument is the same. 
10 Addressing skepticism in general is also an aim in Kant’s transcendental arguments, as the premises of 
such arguments serve as preconditions for rational discourse between two parties. 
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anyone who makes any assertion of knowing something must exclude the negation of 
what they say. Walker treats this argument as having the same form as a transcendental 
argument: there is knowledge (meaningful discourse); it is a necessary condition of 
knowledge that the principle of non-contradiction be reliable. Therefore, the principle of 
non-contradiction is reliable.11
According to Walker, it is Kant’s previous commitment to idealism that allows 
the categories to be necessary since Kant’s transcendental arguments assume the task of 
exhibiting which concepts must be employed for experience to be possible within the 
world of appearances only (Walker, 247). Walker maintains that Kant’s justification for 
idealism lies at B 124-5, where Kant states: 
 
Kant, Walker says, uses transcendental arguments within a context already 
committed to idealism and does not use transcendental arguments in an attempt to justify 
idealism (Walker, 240). He cites Kant’s Dissertation of 1770 (written before the 
Critique) as evidence of this commitment. In the Dissertation, Kant argues for the 
ideality of space and time, saying that they arise from “the nature of the mind,” and 
calling them “formal principles of the sensible world.” Thus, says Walker, transcendental 
argument is not inherently idealist, but is used by Kant within an existing idealistic 
framework. 
 According to Walker, Kant’s aim in the transcendental deduction is to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of the categories. Walker states that for Kant, experience is 
possible only if the categories are applied to the experienced world (Walker, 244). By 
showing the categories to be necessary for experience at all, we show that their 
application within experience is legitimate.  
                                                 
11 Kant’s transcendental argument follows the same form, on Walker’s view. 
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There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its 
objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet 
each other. Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the 
representation alone makes the object possible. 
 
Walker does not see transcendental arguments as an attempt by Kant to justify idealism, 
and he feels that Kant is wrong in assuming that synthetic a priori truths can only be 
yielded by transcendental arguments within an idealist framework. If Walker can show 
that transcendental arguments yield synthetic truths outside of an idealist framework, he 
feels that he will have undermined Kant’s entire case for idealism (Walker, 249). 
Just as he claims that idealism is not supported by transcendental arguments, 
Walker also maintains that transcendental arguments do not rely on transcendental 
idealism. In other words, arguments with the same form as Kant’s transcendental 
arguments can be used to demonstrate non-idealist conclusions about, e.g., objects in 
space, empirical data, and so on.  
 
B. Walker on the Purpose of Transcendental Arguments 
Walker adduces two criteria for transcendental arguments: the satisfaction 
component and the conceptual component.12
                                                 
12 Walker is following the work of Cassam. 
 The conceptual component says that if 
experience is to be possible, some kinds of distinctions and concepts must be used to 
form or shape it. The satisfaction component says that the world must indeed be of a 
certain character if we are able to make these distinctions and use these concepts. Thus, if 
the satisfaction component is met, then we would know that only a world of a certain 
kind “could satisfy the requirements elaborated in the Conceptual Component” (Walker, 
251). One merit of the conceptual component is that it delineates not only what we must 
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believe, but what concepts we must use and what distinctions must be made for 
experience to be possible.13
On Walker’s view, transcendental arguments can be divided into these two 
elements (both components); the satisfaction component is the more difficult one to meet. 
Walker suggests that we have two options for meeting the satisfaction component: 
verificationism and idealism. Clearly, the latter was chosen by Kant, but choosing 
idealism was a mistake, says Walker. Kant was led to commit this mistake, he says, by 
failing to make a distinction between a general concern and a specific concern. The 
general concern is whether our conceptual component can ever be true to the world, and 
the specific concern is whether transcendental arguments as such can answer questions 
about “fully independent reality” (Walker, 251).
  
14
According to Walker, transcendental arguments have a simple form, each 
component of which raises issues. The first premise of such an argument is: “there is 
experience” (or, equivalently, “there is cognition,” or “there is spatiotemporally ordered 
experience”). Among the questions one can raise about such a premise are the following: 
 It is not clear, says Walker, why using 
certain concepts or distinctions makes any demand on what the world must be like: “To 
employ the concept in describing my experience, my experience must exhibit some 
pattern, but nothing follows about the world; unless we can assume that my experience 
somehow matches the world” (Walker, 253).     
 
C. Walker on the Structure of Transcendental Arguments 
                                                 
13 Walker also states that it is not obvious that we need to believe anything for experience to be possible. 
14 This specific concern seems to be contingent upon the general assumption that verificationism is a viable 
course.  
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Is this premise an empirical truth? Must our experience be of objects? Is this experience 
self aware?  
The second premise is: “It is a necessary condition of experience that P.” For 
Kant, this premise must be a priori, as the conclusion is taken by Kant to be an a priori 
truth. And if this premise is not analytic, it must be synthetic. However, if the premise is 
synthetic a priori, it can only be warranted by another transcendental argument, causing a 
regress of transcendental arguments. Therefore, according to Walker, it must be analytic.  
Whatever conclusion is derived from the premises can only hold in the assumed 
conceptual scheme, says Walker (254). That is, we must accept that P is a coherent 
position in order for the argument to work, and we must accept that the account of 
experience (or cognition, etc.) is also coherent. Walker points out that this puts pressure 
on Kant’s claim that the categories are universal.  
Walker claims that the best first premise of a transcendental argument is one that 
appeals to an implicit assumption made by the opponent, not a complicated premise 
involving experience. Such a premise is one that commits the opponent (or skeptic) to 
assuming its truth if any further discourse is to be possible. This premise therefore counts 
as a kind of “ad hominem proof.”15
                                                 
15 Once the skeptic admits the truth of such a premise, they cannot rationally deny it; if they do, we are 
warranted in discounting their rationality. 
 The strategy of the proof is to get the skeptic to admit 
something meaningful as the first premise in an argument, e.g., “A proposition and its 
negation cannot both be true” (Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction) and force them 
to maintain its truth, since, if the skeptic tries to deny this claim, no further coherent 
discourse is possible. This strategy essentially establishes a first principle of possible 
discourse; we cannot enter into a rational discourse with someone who does not 
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recognize the principle of non-contradiction, and the skeptic who at first agrees to this 
principle and then tries to deny it is not rational.  
A first principle like Aristotle’s is just the sort of first premise Walker thinks we 
should use for a transcendental argument (Walker, 256). An appropriate premise is not 
necessarily one we would think very obvious. Instead, it is a principle that is an a priori 
precondition to our discourse and “minimal.” The second premise of a transcendental 
argument should imply an elementary logical inference (i.e., modus ponens) and should 
also stipulate a condition for the possibility of rational discourse, much like the first 
premise (Walker, 257).  
 
V. The Compatibility of Henrich and Walker 
Now, a compatible account of transcendental arguments should fit with Henrich’s 
account of investigation and reflection, and particularly with Kant’s views on the central 
unifying role played by apperception. Reflection and investigation permeate Kant’s 
whole methodological background, as well as his strategy in the transcendental 
deduction. We found that reflection is an awareness of the mind’s different operations, 
including the logical functions of judgment and even the categories. Henrich thinks the 
deduction is an act of investigation, and we will continue to treat it as such for purposes 
of consistency. 
A. Preliminary Questions 
Does Walker’s take on transcendental arguments mesh with the project of a 
deduction writing? A deduction writing is an investigation meant to settle a claim. In 
philosophy, the dispute is between Kant and the skeptic. A sufficient deduction for the 
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legitimacy of the categories will entail showing the source of their legitimacy and, thus, 
their necessity. The best deductions are light on theory and accomplish their task by 
answering the question of fact and the question of right. This can be accomplished by 
telling a story that includes the relevant facts surrounding the origin of the claim and its 
legitimacy. Ultimately, every part of the deduction will focus on justifying its claim: that 
the use of the categories in cognition is legitimate. For Walker, transcendental arguments, 
if we are to take them in the weakest sense, can be used outside of idealism as well. Used 
in the context of idealism, such arguments are meant to establish the necessity of a set of 
regulatory concepts and distinctions, which are themselves constitutive of cognition 
within idealism. They have the form: “There is experience. It is a necessary condition of 
experience that P; therefore, P.” Such a form could also be used empirically: There is fire. 
It is a necessary condition of fire that there is oxygen. Therefore, there is oxygen. But can 
such an argument be used with an ultimate aim of elucidating the legitimacy of the 
categories exclusively? As long as the form of the argument is put to this purpose, it is 
hard to see how it would not fit within the scheme of a philosophical deduction. [And 
Walker tells us, “The very notion of a deduction is compatible with any kind of 
argumentation suitable to reaching the goal—namely, the justification of our claims to a 
priori knowledge” (Walker, 39).] Walker’s transcendental argument is therefore prima 
facie compatible with a philosophical deduction.     
On Walker’s view, a good transcendental argument must meet the conceptual 
component, while meeting the satisfaction component is more difficult. But should we 
regard a transcendental argument as incompatible with a philosophical deduction on the 
grounds that it does not meet the satisfaction component?  We must determine what 
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exactly Kant’s transcendental argument is first, and then see if it meets the satisfaction 
component and the conceptual component. 
 
Now, however, all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness 
in the synthesis of them. Consequently the unity of consciousness is that which 
alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus their objective 
validity, and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions and on which 
even the possibility of the understanding rests.
B. The Unity of Apperception in Kant’s Transcendental Argument 
Kant’s transcendental argument may run somewhat differently than Walker 
proposes. Indeed, Walker has identified one type of transcendental argument. But in his 
aim to justify the use of the categories, Kant gives the synthetic unity of apperception a 
key role, and this is missing in Walker’s account. At B 137, Kant says: 
16
 Since Kant credits the synthetic unity of apperception as the supreme principle of 
the understanding and makes a transcendental argument with it in his transcendental 
deduction, this argument deserves some attention. More importantly, this instance of the 
 
 
Although Kant is speaking about representations and their relation to objects, this is 
indeed a transcendental argument, and one that deals with the synthetic unity of 
apperception. We can summarize the argument as follows: There are unified 
representations. Unified representations require a unity of consciousness. Therefore, there 
is a unity of consciousness. Furthermore, we can read another implied argument: The 
understanding exists. The understanding requires a unified consciousness (apperception). 
Therefore, there is a unified consciousness.  
                                                 
16 Objective validity obtains as long as the “subjective conditions of thinking” allow for the cognition of 
any and all objects (A 89-90/ B 122). In other words, the categories (subjective conditions) have objective 
validity only if they provide a way for us to cognize objects according to the logical functions of judgment 
(Guyer, 125). 
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transcendental argument, which is supposed to show the source of the categories’ 
legitimacy and thus, their necessity, fits with what Henrich tells us about Kant’s 
methodology. As we established earlier, a philosophical deduction and every 
argumentative step therein must relate to principles that help answer the question of fact 
and the question of right, which will show the source of the categories’ legitimacy. While 
referring to the principle of non-contradiction accomplishes nothing to this end (But 
addresses the skeptic directly by employing the ad hominem proof), referring to the 
synthetic unity of apperception as what unifies sensibility, the understanding, and all the 
categories under one self-consciousness shows the source of the categories’ legitimacy: 
synthesis. All representations are originally, necessarily, and synthetically unified under 
the “I think;” it is therefore ultimately the source of their necessary application in 
judgment. By using Henrich’s exposition of how a philosophical deduction is modeled 
after a legal document, we should conclude that any transcendental argument used within 
Kant’s transcendental deduction must refer to the question of fact and the question of 
right. In the case above, the questions are answered by referring to the original synthesis 
of apperception, and therefore, using this transcendental argument in the deduction is 
superior to using the one first adduced by Walker. 
The superior argument we are considering does not start with a minimal premise, 
but rather, one which Kant takes as obvious after establishing the understanding as a 
faculty with its own internal operations, processes, and categories. Moreover, this first 
premise is a precondition for rational discourse, as there could be little rational discussion 
between two parties that did not understand causality in the same manner, for instance. A 
key aspect of this argument is that it does not start from the most minimal premise 
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available, but this does not prevent the first premise from being a precondition of rational 
discourse for the skeptic. A skeptic of any tradition would be hard put to deny that we 
have unified or combined representations; such a denial would preclude the skeptic from 
making any sort of synthetic or meaningful proposition. It is therefore unclear that we 
should use minimal premises in transcendental arguments, as Walker claims. If a skeptic 
can be forced to commit to a premise as long as it is a precondition of rational discourse, 
it does not matter how minimal the premise is.      
There are two elements missing in Walker’s presentation of transcendental 
arguments that are present in Kant’s deduction and Henrich’s review of it: (1) Walker 
argues that a transcendental argument should start from a minimal, less controversial 
premise that must be accepted as a precondition of rational discourse; (2) Walker 
proposes that transcendental arguments can be used regardless of context. Indeed, it is a 
good strategy to use the first premise of an argument to establish a criterion for rational 
discourse. But for Kant, this is only the beginning of the argument’s usefulness. The 
argument using apperception above does not start from a minimal premise, but it is a vital 
argument for the understanding as it establishes the necessary conditions for judgment. 
For Kant, it seems that as long as the first premise can be stated reliably and within our 
representational framework, then it can be used as a reliable premise in our 
investigations.17
                                                 
17 And the argument can also be used in a philosophical deduction, as long as it relates to the question of 
fact and the question of right, as the argument using the synthetic unity of apperception does. 
 And this is a key disagreement between Kant and Walker: a 
transcendental argument need not start from a very minimal premise in order to be good. 
Kant could agree with Walker that a transcendental argument can be used in any context 
as far as form goes, but he may think that content determines the context in which the 
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argument may be justifiably used. As far as a philosophical deduction goes, any good 
argument may be employed so long as it meets the aim of establishing the use of the 
categories in judgment. So Kant and Walker would agree that a philosophical deduction 
is an appropriate context for a transcendental argument, but they disagree on the starting 
point.   
 
Walker insists that at least in Kant’s case, there is no conceptual or modal 
guarantee for the necessity of experience or the categories. There may be other beings 
without experience or categorical functions, or we may cease to have or never have had 
either. Thus, Kant fails to meet the satisfaction component, if we follow Walker’s 
reasoning. The concepts we use could be replaced by other concepts over time, or 
experience might never have obtained at all. We note, however, that Kant does not see 
logical possibility as a good starting point for claims of necessity or any philosophical 
knowledge (Henrich, 41). It is therefore difficult to know exactly how Kant would have 
responded to a modal challenge to his transcendental argumentation, aside perhaps from 
treating such an objection (that our descriptions of the world do not “match up” with it) 
as a malign genie objection much like Descartes.  
C. The Modal Objection      
If Kant’s transcendental argument does not meet the satisfaction component, is it 
still a good argument? Kant has some defense for using transcendental arguments that do 
not meet the satisfaction component. He could say that such a world where there are 
beings without experience is outside of our representational framework; he could say that 
such a being is contradictory and therefore impossible in any world. Thus, Kant could 
31 
 
[Type text] 
 
deny the possibility of a being without any experience. And Kant would say that such a 
thought of a being without experience is possible through concepts, rooted in the logical 
functions of judgment. Thinking through concepts, however minimal, requires a set of 
concepts to begin with or at least a set of distinguishable operations, like the logical 
functions of judgment. Judging about possibility based on a given set of concepts will 
therefore yield contingent results anyway. Besides this, cognition is only yielded when 
concepts are combined with a posteriori elements, but not when concepts are merely 
though of together or in terms of their general predicability. Because of Kant’s 
methodological background, as explained by Henrich, the task of finding a guarantee for 
experience may be a task relegated to thinking and general logic rather than cognition. 
And such a task will be carried out according to a delineated set of concepts already 
present to our cognitive scheme. Finding an argument that meets the satisfaction 
component is therefore viewed by Kant as a task that is outside the bounds of our 
scientific judgment. This line of reasoning does not need to assume that the world is 
ideal. It merely assumes that experience and representation work a certain way, and that 
there are some issues that cannot be judged. 
 
Are transcendental arguments analytic and therefore less than compelling in their 
conclusions? Walker puts the following forward as a Kantian transcendental argument: 
“There is experience. It is a necessary condition of experience that P; therefore, P.” And 
D. The Question of Analyticity  
P designates the application of the categories of the understanding to experience. Now, 
Walker also says there are two criteria a transcendental argument can meet: the 
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conceptual component and the satisfaction component. The former is met when the 
argument shows that experience really does require the categories (P is necessary). But 
this is implied in the first premise, since experience is category-governed cognition and 
judgment. In other words, the term “experience” in the first premise already contains the 
second premise. It is difficult to see, then, how this argument could be anything but 
analytic: it is a tautology whose conclusion is implied in the first and second premises.  
But perhaps Kant’s own transcendental argument involving the unity of 
apperception has more merit. The argument is as follows: “There are unified 
representations. Unified representations require a unity of consciousness. Therefore, there 
is a unity of consciousness.” This argument is meant to establish apperception as 
necessary for our possession of unified representations. In this argument, the term 
“unified representations” also implies its own necessary conditions: Such representations, 
to be unified in the first place, require a unity of self-consciousness. In other words, a 
unified representation is something that requires a unified self-consciousness 
(apperception). The first premise therefore implies the second premise. How, then, are we 
to read this argument as anything but analytic and tautologous? 
Indeed, it is the transcendental argument’s attempt to meet the conceptual 
component that makes it analytic. If I said that P is necessary for Q because Q is defined 
as requiring P, we would count the phrase “P is necessary for Q” as implied in the first 
premise. We meet the conceptual component in such an argument, and we can fend off 
skepticism by having the skeptic commit to the first premise (as long as it is a 
precondition for rational discourse, we can employ the ad hominem proof), but the 
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argument clearly becomes analytic, with no new information being gleaned from the 
conclusion that was not already in the premises. 
  
E. A Reply to the Skeptic’s Modal Objection 
Kant’s transcendental arguments are analytic and do not meet the satisfaction 
component, and we wonder how the skeptic would view them in light of this fact. As 
noted above, Q (experience or, equivalently, unified representations) may or may not be 
the case in all imaginable worlds. This fact does little to establish the necessity of the 
argument’s second premise. But if the skeptic commits to the premise that there is 
experience, since one cannot rationally engage without categorically-governed judgment, 
then the skeptic must concede that P is necessary. But perhaps the first premise of a 
transcendental argument is too much for the skeptic to agree with; perhaps the skeptic 
thinks that we may have experience now but that it may not be the case for other beings 
or at other times. Or perhaps the skeptic thinks that there are no unified representations, 
or no representations at all. As we saw above, Kant has a defense against this line of 
reasoning that does not rely on idealism, but that does not change the fact that there is 
nothing guaranteeing that there is experience and that the argument is analytic.  
The transcendental argument was under scrutiny because, although it can commit 
a skeptic to accepting its first premise and its conclusion, Walker is right in saying that it 
does little to establish that experience or the categories are necessary in every 
conceivable world. However, Kant could reply to this modal challenge by showing that 
certain concepts are necessary for experience and that these concepts cannot be applied to 
every conceivable world, as he does with the first instance of the transcendental 
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argument. Further, Kant could show that there can be no beings without a unity of 
consciousness since that unity is necessary for any synthesis of representations at all 
(including the possession of concepts).  It does not matter if Walker is right about Kant’s 
prior commitment to idealism; Kant’s rebuttal to the modal objection works 
independently of any thesis regarding idealism. If anything, committing to idealism can 
only bolster the strength of the transcendental argument while rejecting idealism does 
nothing to weaken the transcendental argument. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
We gave a brief summary of Henrich’s and Walker’s positions. We saw that the 
question of right and the question of fact frame the entire project of Kant’s philosophical 
deduction. The role that these questions play in the deduction is only made clear by a 
historical account of Kant’s methodology like the one given by Henrich. Henrich’s 
account also provided criteria for establishing which instance of a transcendental 
argument we should consider in the transcendental deduction: one that involves the 
original synthetic unity of apperception; Kant’s transcendental argument at B 137 
accomplishes this and is therefore used appropriately in the deduction machinery to 
answer the question of fact and the question of right, as well as to show that synthesis is 
the source of the categories’ necessity. After viewing the two interpretations (one of 
Kant’s methodology, the other of transcendental arguments), we found that the two views 
are prima facie compatible. Furthermore, we found that Kant’s transcendental arguments 
meet the conceptual component but fail to meet the satisfaction component. The modal 
objection stated that Kant can provide no guarantee for experience or the categories. Yet 
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we saw that this is not a problem for Kant since meeting the satisfaction component 
requires us to step outside of our representational framework; according to Henrich, 
speculation about beings without experience is a task relegated to thinking and not 
judgment. Finally, we saw that the transcendental arguments above are analytic, which 
puts pressure on Kant for considering them worthy of use in the transcendental deduction 
of the categories. In the end, though, we found that transcendental arguments are very 
good at establishing the necessity of the categories as long as their first premise is a 
reliable ratio vera that the skeptic must commit to; thus, transcendental arguments are 
appropriately used in the transcendental deduction of the categories even if they do not 
meet the satisfaction component.  
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